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Abstract
We are studying the Gately point, an established solution concept for co-
operative games. We point out that there are superadditive games for which
the Gately point is not unique, i.e. in general the concept is rather set-valued
than an actual point. We derive conditions under which the Gately point is
guaranteed to be a unique imputation and provide a geometric interpreta-
tion. The Gately point can be understood as the intersection of a line de-
fined by two points with the set of imputations. Our uniqueness conditions
guarantee that these two points do not coincide. We provide demonstrative
interpretations for negative propensities to disrupt. We briefly show that
our uniqueness conditions for the Gately point include quasibalanced games
and discuss the relation of the Gately point to the τ -value in this context.
Finally, we point out relations to cost games and the ACA method and
end upon a few remarks on the implementation of the Gately point and an
upcoming software package for cooperative game theory.
JEL-classification: C71
Keywords: TU games; solution concept; quasibalanced games; utopia payoff;
cost games; ACA method
1 Introduction
Dermot Gately introduced a new solution concept for cooperative games with
transferable utility in Gately (1974) based on minimizing the temptation to leave
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the grand coalition for individual players. In the original paper Gately (1974)
the problem of sharing the gains from a joint investment in an electric power
grid in India between the participating regions is resolved with the help of the
concept “equal propensity to disrupt”. Since the publication of Gately (1974), the
so-called Gately point has become a well-established solution concept taught in
books by Straffin (1996) and Narahari (2014) and mentioned in highly regarded
survey articles, like e.g. Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) and Young (1994).
As of 6 January 2019, 211 quotes of Gately (1974) can be found on GoogleScholar.
From its name Gately point one is tempted to assume that the solution concept in
question was always unique. In this paper we point out that this is not actually the
case. We strive to answer the following question: Under which conditions is the
Gately point a unique imputation? Along the way, we also discuss what negative
propensities to disrupt tell us about a cooperative game.
2 Preliminary definitions
We are studying a transferable utility game (TU game) in characteristic function
form consisting of the player set N = {1, . . . , n} and the characteristic function
v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0. We are using the shorthand notations
vi = v({i}) for i = 1, . . . , n,
for the worths of the singleton coalitions.
Definition 1. (see Branzei et al (2008), p. 20) The so-called utopia payoff of
player i is given by
Mi = v(N)− v(N\{i}) for i = 1, . . . , n,
i.e. Mi is the marginal contribution of player i to the grand coalition.
In this article we will only study games satisfying essentiality in the sense of
Chakravarty et al (2015), p. 23.
Definition 2. (see Chakravarty et al (2015), p. 23) We call a transferable utility
game with player set N = {1, . . . , n} and characteristic function v : 2N → R
essential if
n∑
j=1
vj < v(N). (1)
The imputation set of any essential TU game is guaranteed to consist of more than
a single point. For a solution concept in cooperative game theory one would nor-
mally prefer the solution vector x ∈ Rn to be an imputation, i.e. both individually
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rational xi ≥ vi for all i = 1, . . . , n and efficient
∑n
j=1 xj = v(N). For a formal
defintion of the imputation set we refer to Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007), p. 20, or
Narahari (2014), p. 407.
Note that any cooperative game satisfying (1) is strategically equivalent to a 0-1-
normalized game, see Maschler et al (2013), p. 670, or Chakravarty et al (2015),
p. 24.
Definition 3. (see e.g. Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007), p. 10) We call a transferable
utility game with player set N = {1, . . . , n} and characteristic function v : 2N → R
weakly superadditive if
v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S) + vi for all S ⊆ N and i /∈ S. (2)
Note that weak superadditivity (2) guarantees
vi ≤Mi for i = 1, . . . , n. (3)
For later convenience we repeat the following
Definition 4. (see e.g. Straffin (1996), p. 131, or Narahari (2014), p. 408) We
call a transferable utility game with player set N = {1, . . . , n} and characteristic
function v : 2N → R superadditive if
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅. (4)
Finally, we would like to introduce the following game property.
Definition 5. We call a transferable utility game with player set N = {1, . . . , n}
and characteristic function v : 2N → R weakly constant-sum if
vi + v(N\{i}) = v(N) for all i = 1, . . . , n. (5)
Note that weakly constant-sum games v can equivalently be characterized by
vi = Mi for i = 1, . . . , n. (6)
3 Nonuniqueness of the Gately point and uniqueness condi-
tions
In this section we will introduce the Gately point as a solution concept for coop-
erative games along the lines of the article by Littlechild and Vaidya (1976).
The following definition is central to understanding the Gately point as a solution
concept for cooperative games.
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Definition 6. (see Littlechild and Vaidya (1976), p. 152) For a given transferable
utility game with player set N = {1, . . . , n} and characteristic function v : 2N → R
the expression
d(i, x) =
v(N)− v(N\{i})− xi
xi − vi
=
Mi − xi
xi − vi
(7)
quantifies the propensity to disrupt of player i for a payoff vector x ∈ Rn in the
interior of the imputation set, i.e.
∑n
j=1 xj = v(N) with xi > vi for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Expression (7) quantifies the disruption caused if player i breaks away from the
grand coalition. Within (7) the denominator stands for the loss incurred by player
i for breaking away from the grand coalition, whereas the numerator stands for
the joint loss of the rest of the players due to the breakup caused by player i.
The original approach in Gately (1974) for three-person games was generalized to
n-person games by Littlechild and Vaidya (1976), p. 152. The idea is simply to
find an imputation x ∈ Rn with minimal propensity to disrupt. It can be shown
that this minimal propensity to disrupt can be found by equating the propensity
to disrupt over all players, i.e.
d(i, x) = d∗ for i = 1, . . . , n.
As pointed out by Littlechild and Vaidya (1976), p. 153, using (7) one can easily
find the following closed-form expression
d∗ =
(n− 1)v(N)−
∑n
j=1 v(N\{j})
v(N)−
∑n
j=1 vj
=
∑n
j=1Mj − v(N)
v(N)−
∑n
j=1 vj
(8)
which also highlights the fact that the Gately point is a solution concept depending
solely on the values of the coalitions of sizes 1, n− 1 and n.
Looking at (7) one recognizes that for d∗ = −1 we can not solve for the Gately
point. This case can indeed occur for games satisfying (1) and (2). We formalize
these findings in
Theorem 1. For an essential transferable utility game with player set N = {1, . . . , n}
and characteristic function v : 2N → R the Gately point is well-defined unless the
equal propensity to disrupt d∗ = −1. We can find the Gately point as the unique
imputation x ∈ Rn with the components
xi = vi + (v(N)−
n∑
j=1
vj)
Mi − vi∑n
j=1Mj −
∑n
j=1 vj
(9)
for i = 1, . . . , n, if one of the following two conditions holds:
a) For games satisfying (3) there needs to hold
vi < Mi for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (10)
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i.e. (3) is satisfied with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
b) We also obtain the Gately point x ∈ Rn as a unique imputation if
vi ≥ Mi for i = 1, . . . , n, (11)
as long as (11) is satisfied with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
i.e. as long as the game is not weakly constant-sum (6).
Proof: As long as d∗ 6= −1 the expression (9) can be found using (8) by simple
algebra. When d∗ 6= −1 it is justified to set xi = vi for those i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
vi = Mi. Looking at the expression (9), essentiality (1) implies that x ∈ R
n is an
imputation if and only if
Mi − vi∑n
j=1Mj −
∑n
j=1 vj
≥ 0
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The latter condition is fulfilled for both games satisfying (3)
and games satisfying (11) as long as these games are not weakly constant-sum (6).
Remark 1. The case d∗ < 0 can be interpretated as enthusiasm of each player
not to be the one left out of the grand coalition. In other words: d∗ < 0 indicates
that coalitions of size n − 1 are preferred over the grand coalition. In the case of
(11) being satisfied with strict inequality for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , n} this fact is
particularly striking as there even holds d∗ < −1.
Remark 2. Geometrically, (9) allows us to interpret the Gately point as the in-
tersection of the imputation set with the half-line drawn from the point (v1, . . . , vn)
with directional vector (M1 − v1, . . . ,Mn − vn).
Remark 3. For 0-normalized games (9) simplifies to
xi = v(N)
Mi∑n
j=1Mj
(12)
for i = 1, . . . , n.
We finally consider
Example 1. Let the three-person game v be given by
v1 = 3, v2 = 4, v3 = 5, v({1, 2}) = 9, v({1, 3}) = 10, v({2, 3}) = 11, v(N) = 14.
The above game is clearly superadditive (4) and essential (1), but the propen-
sity to disrupt equals −1 for every imputation x. In a sense, the Gately point for
v would be the complete imputation set. Naturally, one would make the identical
observation considering the 0-normalization of v, i.e. the coalitional game w with
w1 = w2 = w3 = 0, w({1, 2}) = w({1, 3}) = w({2, 3}) = w(N) = 2, or the 0-1-
normalization of v, i.e. the coalitional game u with u1 = u2 = u3 = 0, u({1, 2}) =
u({1, 3}) = u({2, 3}) = u(N) = 1. Note that the latter could also be interpreted
as a weighted voting game.
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4 Relations to the τ -value
In the previous section we have seen that the Gately point is the intersection of
the imputation set with a line connecting the points (v1, . . . , vn) and (M1, . . . ,Mn)
and pointed out a problem for the case that these two points coincide (6). There
is another well-established solution concept in cooperative game theory computing
the intersection of a line connecting two points with the imputation set, i.e. the
τ -value proposed by Tijs (1981).
Definition 7. (see Branzei et al (2008), p. 20) The remainder R(S, i) of player
i in coalition S is the amount which remains for player i if coalition S forms and
the rest of the players in coalition S all obtain their individual utopia payoffs, i.e.
R(S, i) = v(S)−
∑
j∈S,j 6=i
Mj .
We can define a vector of minimal rights with components
mi = max
S:i∈S
R(S, i), for i = 1, . . . , n,
since player i has a justification to ask at least mi in the grand coalition.
The τ -value is defined only for quasibalanced games.
Definition 8. (see e.g. Branzei et al (2008), pp. 31) We call a transferable utility
game with player set N = {1, . . . , n} and characteristic function v : 2N → R
quasibalanced if
mi ≤Mi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (13)
and
n∑
j=1
mj ≤ v(N) ≤
n∑
j=1
Mj . (14)
For a quasibalanced game v the τ -value is defined as the intersection of the impu-
tation set with the line from the minimal rights vector (m1, . . . , mn) to the utopia
payoff vector (M1, . . . ,Mn).
Remark 4. (see e.g. Branzei et al (2008), p. 32) We can find the τ -value with
the components
τi = αmi + (1− α)Mi,
where α ∈ [0, 1] is uniquely determined by the condition
∑n
i=1 τi = v(N).
Combining (8) and condition (14) we find that for quasibalanced games d∗ ≥ 0 is
guaranteed and we arrive at
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Corollary 1. The Gately point is always unique for quasibalanced games.
Note that the conditions we formulated for the Gately point to be a unique im-
putation are more general than quasibalancedness, i.e. there are games for which
the τ -value is not defined whereas the Gately point is. Consider
Example 2. Let the three-person game v be given by
v1 = 3, v2 = 4, v3 = 5, v({1, 2}) = 9, v({1, 3}) = 10, v({2, 3}) = 11, v(N) = 14.5.
The game v is not quasibalanced and its Gately point can be computed to
x1 = 3
5
6
, x2 = 4
5
6
, x3 = 5
5
6
.
We finally observe that the problem we report for the Gately point never occurs for
the τ -value which we already mentioned to be the intersection of the imputation
set with a line drawn from the point (m1, . . . , mn) to the point (M1, . . . ,Mn), see
Tijs (1981). However, if these two points coincide, then (14) guarantees this point
to be an imputation and thus the τ -value of the game. Note that in this special
case there is d∗ = 0.
5 Application to cost games and relations to the ACA-method
We are looking at cost games in characteristic function form consisting of the set
N = {1, . . . , n} of agents (or purposes, projects or services) and the characteristic
function c : 2N → R with c(∅) = 0. We are using the shorthand notation
ci = c({i}) for i = 1, . . . , n,
for the costs of single agents. The connection to TU games is given by the associ-
ated savings game v for N = {1, . . . , n} defined by
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
ci − c(S)
for every coalition S. Note that the associated savings game v is automatically
0-normalized.
We are now discussing the so-called ACA (Alternate Cost Avoided) method, i.e. an
established method for cost allocation going back to Ransmeier (1942), along the
lines of Straffin and Heaney (1981). The ACA method has been widely discussed,
see also Otten (1993), Tijs and Driessen (1996) and Young (1994).
The ACA method is based on the concept of allocating separable costs
SCi = c(N)− c(N\{i}) = ci −Mi
7
for each agent i = 1, . . . , n. The remaining nonseparable costs
NSC = c(N)−
n∑
j=1
SCj =
n∑
j=1
Mj − v(N) (15)
are assigned in proportion to ci−SCi, i.e. the final cost allocation for an individual
agent i is
yi = SCi +
ci − SCi∑n
j=1 cj − SCj
NSC.
As pointed out in Straffin and Heaney (1981), p. 40, the corresponding savings
allocation x ∈ Rn is exactly the Gately point, i.e.
xi = ci − yi = v(N)
Mi∑n
j=1Mj
as seen in (12).
It is very natural to understand why the problem of nonuniqueness of ACA never
came up in the context of cost games. In practice, only subadditive cost games
are studied, i.e. the corresponding savings game is superadditive (4), see Young
(1994), p. 1197. The ACA method can only fail to deliver a unique cost allocation
if Mi = 0, or equivalently ci = SCi, for i = 1, . . . , n. Then (1) implies NSC < 0,
whereas studies of ACA for good reason assume nonnegativity of nonseparable
costs, see Otten (1993), p. 177, and Tijs and Driessen (1996), p. 1019. Practical
ACA calculations would normally stop if NSC < 0 and this implies d∗ < 0, see
(8) and (15). We finally consider
Example 3. Let the subadditive three-agent cost game c be given by
c1 = 7, c2 = 8, c3 = 9, c({1, 2}) = 14, c({1, 3}) = 15, c({2, 3}) = 16, c(N) = 23.
The corresponding savings game u is the weighted voting game u1 = u2 = u3 =
0, u({1, 2}) = u({1, 3}) = u({2, 3}) = u(N) = 1 we already know from Example 1.
The Gately point does not exist and so ACA fails to deliver a unique cost allocation.
In general, ACA can only run into problems if all coalitions of size n− 1 and the
grand coalition make identical savings. Then we would expect a coalition of size
n−1 to form, but we can not use ACA to single out the one agent i to be left out.
6 Final remarks
The main purpose of this article is to answer the question when it is at all sensible
to compute the Gately point of a TU game v. We derived very general condi-
tions for the Gately point to be a unique imputation and pointed out why weakly
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constant-sum games lead to problems. We feel that our analysis underlines the
criticism of the Gately point made in Littlechild and Vaidya (1976), p. 153, that
the solution concept only makes use of the values of the coalitions of sizes 1, n− 1
and n and completely ignores the rest of the information contained in the coalition
function v.
The nonuniqueness of the Gately point was first discussed in Anwander (2017) and
it was discovered during efforts to implement the Gately point in R. The authors
are currently finalizing an R-package named CoopGame (see Staudacher and Anwander
(2019)) which the authors hope to make publicly available via CRAN, the Compre-
hensive R Archive Network. Among various other solution concepts, the package
CoopGame will not only provide an implementation of the Gately point, but also
provide the user with possibilities to compute the equal propensity to disrupt d∗
of a given cooperative game v. The scope of our Gately point implementation is
slightly broader as for an inessential game v in the sense of Narahari (2014), p. 408,
i.e. if (4) holds with
∑n
j=1 vj = v(N), our code will simply return (v1, . . . , vn).
Otherwise, we make sure to check the conditions derived in this paper before the
computation of the Gately point and to return a meaningful message in the case
the user specifies a TU game v with an equal propensity to disrupt d∗ = −1.
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